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Abstract: the strategic goal of this paper is to study the effects of the prevention 
policies against money laundering on growth in the gulf countries (Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Oman) from 1980 to 2014. Thus, the 
logistic regression (logit model) had given three fundamental results. The first 
had shown that the main policies in matter of fight against money laundering 
(anti money laundering law AMLL, suspicious transaction reporting STR, the 
criminalizing of terrorist financing CTF) have had positive effects on the 
increasing of probabilities to realize more growth. The second is that the said 
policies have had positive effects on the increasing of the degree of openness of 
the whole sample. The third is that the variable (proximity) had a positive and 
significant effect on anti-money laundering policies. 
Keywords: Money laundering, growth, efficiency, gulf countries 
JEL: G14, G21 
Résumé: L’objectif fondamental de ce papier est d’étudier les effets des 
politiques de prévention contre le blanchiment d’argent sur la croissance dans 
les pays du golfe (Arabie Saoudite, Koweït, Qatar, Bahreïn, les Emirats arabes 
unies et Oman) et ce durant la période allant de 1980 jusqu’à 2014. La 
régression logit du modèle a convergé à trois résultats fondamentaux. Le 
premier est que la politique actuelle de lutte contre le blanchiment a généré un 
effet  positif sur la croissance des pays du golfe. Le deuxième est que lesdites 
politiques ont eu un effet positif sur l’ouverture économique de l’ensemble des 
pays du golfe. Le troisième est que la variable proximity avait un effet positif et 
significatif sur le blanchiment d’argent 
JEL: G14, G21 
 
 
 
  
1. Introduction 
Since long time, the phenomena of Money laundering had constituted a major 
problem for governments because its source was illicit and this type of money is 
the result of illicit activities (drug, human organ traffics and others). Since 
11/09/2011 and the destruction of the world trade tower the UN and their 
different institutions have gave more importance to money laundering because 
the major part of this illicit money was accused to finance terrorism. Just after 
these attacks, a set of lows were adopted such as the anti-money laundering law, 
the criminalization of terrorism law and the ability given to banks to report the 
suspicious transactions.  
Nevertheless, unlike other economic subjects, the treatment of the problem is 
more difficult simply because there is not a database on this variable. Also, it is 
difficult to follow all their stages beginning by their constitution to their entry in 
the economic circuit. As a consequence we will try in this paper to study the 
effects of ML on growth with logit models. Thus, on the first section we will try 
to focus our interest in the origin and definitions of the ML concept. The third 
section will presents the macroeconomic and microeconomic effects of ML. 
The fourth section will present the empirical study and discuss the main results. 
2. Origin, definitions, and process of money laundering concept 
The "economic and financial crime" refers generally to any form of non-violent crime 
which results in a financial loss. This crime covers a wide range of illegal activities, 
including fraud, tax evasion and money laundering. The latter is one of the most 
widespread forms of economic and financial crime. The origin of the term "money 
laundering" comes from the fact that in 1928 in Chicago, a leader of a mafia family 
(Al Capone) would have bought a chain of laundries is called "the Sanitary Cleaning 
Shops ". This legal status allows him to recycle financial resources from numerous 
illicit activities1. 
However, from the 70s, the term "money laundering" has become widespread and it 
was used, for the first time, in 1982 in a court case. The first definition of money 
laundering having an international scope was given in 1988 by the United Nations 
Convention against trafficking in drugs and psychotropic substances (Vienna, 19 
December 1988). She was developing mainly around the notions of conversion or 
transfer of property acquired illegally. It will be taken up by the Strasbourg 
Convention of 1990. The FATF in 1990 gave a more inclusive definition: "Money 
laundering is the process of transformation of criminal proceeds to disguise their 
illegal origin". 
Similarly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines money laundering as "a 
process by which the illicit source of assets or produced obtained by criminal activity 
is concealed to obscure the link between the funds obtained and the source of initial 
offense»2. By consequent despite the plurality of definitions of money laundering we 
can converge to a common element: the transfer of illegally acquired assets towards 
the legal economic system.  
 
2.1 Process of money laundering  
                                                             
1 http://www.harmattantv.com/_uploads/complements/le_blanchiment_dargent.pdf 
2 Rapport FMI : https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/fre/amlf.htm 
CD Schaap (1999)3usually distinguished three distinct phases in the process of money 
laundering: 
 - Placement stage: The purpose of this phase is to place cash into a bank account, 
hiding its illegal origin. 
- Layering stage (dispersion / stacking): to hide one's tracks by complex financial 
transactions to hide the source of funds or legitimize their possession.  
- Integration stage: money being laundered and its initial origin is totally hidden. Thus 
the investments, in the legal economy, can be beginning. 
2.2 Methods of  money laundering 
We will present the most used methods of money laundering:  
- Hand change: the aim of this tool is to mask the real origin of ownership of funds. 
This means that the recycler transfers the money to other persons judged by him as 
their confidents, and considered worthy of trust in the community, and not attractive 
of attention (family members, friends or associates).  
- Fractionation (smurfing): it means that the money launderer tries to divide the 
money into little sums and, deposit them in several accounts in diverse banks and 
financial institutions. Also, he can buy bank drafts or money orders at various 
institutions, usually with a value below the amount that would result in a mandatory 
reporting. Bank drafts or money orders are generally payable to third parties and 
deposited in the same way as cash in a central account. 
- Buy in cash of valuable assets: generally the launderers can recourse to the cash 
purchase of high value goods (cars, bus, automobiles, boats) and transfer them to the 
third parties. The goods may subsequently be sold in order to create a legal origin for 
these goods and products. 
                                                             
3 CD. Schaap, "Money Laundering: A Prosecutor's perspective" in Journal of Money Laundering Control (1999) 
Vol. 3, No 2, Henry Stewart Publications, London. 
- Smuggling of currency: recyclers send their illicit funds abroad, often to countries 
where the funds will not be severely controlled by the law and systems that record 
money newly entering into the financial system. 
- Use of exchange offices: the illicit funds can be used to buy foreign currency which 
can then be transferred to accounts in foreign banks, or converted into a functional 
currency to another institution. 
- Investing in casino games: the launderers can use the casinos as tool for creating 
licit sources for their dirty money.  Indeed, they obtain tokens in exchange of cash. 
Having played and wagered on minimum sums, they return, to the desk, to convert 
their tokens into liquid money or in checks. 
3. Effects of Money Laundering on economics variables  
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the annual volume of money 
laundering operations in the world accounts for between 2% and 5% of world 
GDP4 which corresponds to a sum between 1000 and 3000 billion US dollars. despite 
that all countries are affected by the phenomenon of money laundering it seems that 
some areas of the world,  are more sensitive than others. Among the sensitive 
countries, we can find:  
- The United States, the Latin America, Central America and the Caribbean Basin 
(involved in drug production and trafficking and fraudulent financial flows). 
 - The Europe (historically attractive financial places). 
-  Africa: especially countries as Nigeria, Togo and Benin  
-  Countries of the former Soviet Union and former Eastern bloc (Russian mafia and 
investments in real estate, restaurant, mining)  
- The Asian zone (old tradition settlement of cash transactions and the network of 
underground banks that effectively promote the transfer of capital anonymously). 
                                                             
4Site officiel du FMI : http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/fre/2006/03/pdf/books.pdf 
According to the IMF, the volume of dirty money laundered in the Asian region is 
"alarming". If we consider the particular case (Asian zone) Gulf countries, Arab 
magazine Al-Majalla5has revealed, for example, a growing concern of the Saudi 
authorities concerning the attempts of market infiltrations from the Gulf countries. 
This is due to the proliferation of institutions and the increase of exchange 
liberalization, which can incite and encourage the launderers to do all sorts of 
operations with the abroad, without worrying about being controlled. 
In the same line of conduct the inspectors of the central office of exchange in Arab 
Emirates united found that some important movements of capital seem to have not a   
commercial rationale. In light of this overview of the importance of laundered 
financial flows, it would be interesting to focus on the macroeconomic impacts of 
money laundering. 
3 Effects of Money laundering on the economic equilibriums 
According to several experts, the consequences of money laundering are very 
damaging economically. Indeed, this section presents an overall view of the 
theoretical literature on the macroeconomic effects of money laundering. 
3.1 At the microeconomic level 
From a microeconomic perspective, the risk comes mainly from the potential 
destabilization of certain private sectors acting in legal economy by the penetration of 
illicit funds. According to Novis McDowell (2001), one of the most notorious 
microeconomic effects of money laundering is that which affect the private sector.  
Indeed the companies having access to illicit funds could substantially subsidize 
products or services by selling them at less than the market.  In certain case the prices 
can be below the cost of production. It is therefore clear that these firms have a 
competitive advantage over those who have to borrow on financial markets. This may 
create an illicit competition between the enterprises acting in legal way   and those 
who benefit from illegitimate funds at low cost. Although the size of this problem is 
debatable, it therefore goes against the traditional principle of just and legal 
                                                             
5 78 La revue arabe AL-MAJALLA, n° 1069, 6-12 Août 2000, p.1 
competition, favoring the criminal companies. The author note that the economy, as a 
whole may suffer from poor allocation of funds from the crime. Given that priority is 
given to the protection of the bleaching process and not on seeking gains, money can 
thus be used to fund activities that are not optimal from an economic point of view. In 
this way, economic growth could be weakened. 
3.2  At the macroeconomic level 
From a macroeconomic point of view, government authorities have started to grant 
significant importance to money laundering since the 80s. The IMF6 estimates that the 
laundering activity impacts  negatively the GNP of some national economies, and if 
we consider the abundant successive financial transactions which are usually 
performed during the stacking phase and cross national borders, we can reasonably 
assume that nations are under strong macroeconomic disturbances.  
Bongard, (2001)7 and the FATF estimate that the impact can affect many key 
macroeconomic variables such as prices, economic growth, balance of payments, the 
exchange rate and therefore on monetary policy for infiltrated country. 
McDowell&Novis (2001)8 state, in their research, that money laundering can 
influence the exchange rates and the interest rates because the money is invested to 
avoid its detection and not according to the research of high returns. Thus, this may 
increase the risk inherent to a monetary instability and leads to a misallocation of 
resources and creates distortions in the prices of goods and financial assets.  
Quirk (1996)9 and Camdessus (1998) have tried to study the effects of money 
laundering on the stability of the economy, and the financing of investment. They 
concluded that money laundering may result in adverse changes in the money demand 
and increases the volatility of international capital flows, exchange rates and interest 
rates. 
                                                             
6 Rapport FMI 2009 : https://www.imf.org/external/french/pubs/ft/ar/2009/pdf/ar09_fra.pdf 
7Bongard, Kai (2001), Wirtschaftsfaktor Geldwäsche: Analyse und Bekämpfung, Wiesbaden 2001. 
8 McDowell J., Novis G., « The Consequences of Money Laudering and Financial Crime », Economic 
Perspectives, Vol. 6, N° 2, May 2001. 
9Quirk, Peter J. 1996."Macroeconomic Implications of Money Laundering".International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper 96/66. June. 
Quirk (1997)10 has noted that "Fears that anti-money laundering laws and regulations 
will undermine efforts to liberalize financial markets, or that opening up financial 
markets will promote money laundering, are unfounded. Money laundering threatens 
economic and financial systems in many countries, and the international financial 
community should strongly support anti-laundering efforts”.  
Blum & al (1998)11  think that money laundering has a negative impact on the tax 
situation of a country. The central argument is that the share of income having illicit 
sources and which is fed back into the legal economic system is likely to attract the 
attention of tax authorities. They even argue that criminals swell tax statements from 
legal enterprises they use as cover and pay over taxes.  
Aluko (2012)12 has studied the effect of money laundering on the financing of the 
investment. He concluded that money laundering has a negative effect on economic 
growth and financial stability. Also, the author has concluded that it exists a positive 
relationship between corruption and money laundering in most countries. The author 
recommended that countries affected by money laundering are obliged to cooperate to 
reduce these negative effects.  
Idowu (2012)13 studied the macroeconomic effects of money laundering. He 
concluded that it has a negative impact on investment financing, government revenue, 
the rate of economic growth and threatens political stability and internal security of a 
nation.  
hsan et Razi (2012)14, have studied the macroeconomic effects of money laundering 
and have concluded that money laundering has an effect on GDP and foreign direct 
                                                             
10 Quirk, Peter J. 1997 “Money Laundering: Muddying the Macroeconomy.” Finance and 
Development.International Monetary Fund.March. Vol. 34, No. 1 
11Jack A. Blum, et al.,  Financial Havens, Banking Secrecy and Money Laundering, CrimePrevention and 
Criminal Justice News Letter 8, no. 34/35 (1998). 
12AyodejiAluko, MahmoodBagheri, (2012) "The impact of money laundering on economic and financial 
stability and on political development in developing countries: The case of Nigeria", Journal of Money 
Laundering Control, Vol. 15 Iss: 4, pp.442 - 457 
13Idowu, A. (2012). Anti-money laundering policy and its effects on bank performance on Nigeria Dept. of 
Management and Accounting Faculty of Management Sciences. 
14IqraIhsan& Amir Razi University of Lahore, Pakistan : Money Laundering-A Negative Impact on 
Economy,Global Journal of Management and Business Research Volume 12 Issue 17 Version 1.0 Year 2012 
investment. Ayodegi (2011)15 has studied the macroeconomic effects of money 
laundering and he found that this phenomenon negatively affects economic growth 
and financial stability.  FATF (2009)16 found that the use of the securities industry to 
launder money is considered a real threat to the economy because it reduces funding 
instruments. Bartlett (2002)17  found that money laundering will reduce the foreign 
trade and long-term cash flows.  
Econometric analysis  
In this present research, we will use logistic regression which is defined as a 
technique allowing to adjust a regression surface to data when the dependent 
variable is dichotomous (zero or one). Indeed their uses do not pose problem 
when they are used as explanatory variables. However, when they are used as 
the dependent variable, the ordinary least squares fails. The major advantage of 
this technique is to quantify the strength of association between each 
independent variable and the dependent variable, taking into account the effect 
of other variables included in the model (adjusted measure) (1.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
15Ayodeji, A., &Mahmood, B. (2012). The impact of money laundering on economic and financial stability and 
on political development in developing countries: The case of Nigeria. Journal of Money Laundering Control, 
15(4), 442–457. 
16 Rapport GAFI 2009 : http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/2008%202009%20FR.pdf 
17 Bartlett, Brent. 2002. “The Negative Effects of Money Laundering on Economic Development,” For the 
Asian Development Bank, Regional Technical Assistance Project No.5967, Countering Money Laundering in 
The Asian and Pacific Region, May. 
1-Model specification 
We seek to explain the values of Y by X, meaning estimate the probability that 
Yi = 1 knowing Xi (or Yi = 0, which is the same). We notice that: 
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi) = Pr(Xiθ + εi ≥ 0|Xi) = Pr(Xiθ ≥ −εi |Xi) = F−ε(Xiθ) 
The logit model corresponds to the logistic law, introduced specifically for this 
type of model, distribution function Λ: 
F(X୧ θ) =Λ (Xiθ) =
ୣష౔౟ಐ
ଵାୣష౔౟ಐ
 
Hence the logistic regression in our model is explained by the following 
models: 
ܿݎ݅݉݁௜௧ = ߚ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߚ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߚ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧(1) 
݈݈ܽ݉௜௧ = ߙ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߙ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߙ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧(2) 
ݏݐݎ௜௧ = ߛ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߛ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߛ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧(3) 
ܿݐ ௜݂௧ = ߜ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߜ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߜ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ (4) 
With: 
 ܿݎ݅݉݁௜௧ : takes the value 1 if the country criminalizes the money laundering 
and 0 if not 
݈݈ܽ݉௜௧  : takes the value 1 if the country has adopted an anti-money laundering 
law and 0 if not 
ݏݐݎ௜௧ : takes the value 1 if the country has adopted a system of suspicious 
transaction reporting  and 0 if not. 
 
ܿݐ ௜݂௧: takes the value 1 if the country has adopted a law which criminalizes 
terrorist financing and 0 if not. 
Lngdp: neperian log of GDP per capita (constant 2005 US $). 
Lnopness: neperian log of exports and imports (% of GDP). 
Proximity: the degree of risk inherent in the proximity of a country to areas 
highly risked. It takes the value 1 if the country is surrounded by a single risky 
country, the value 2 if the country is surrounded by two risky countries,  3 if the 
country is surrounded by 3 risky countries and 4 if the country is surrounded by 
4 risky countries. 
Table1: estimation of model (logit model) 
 ࢒࢔ࢍࢊ࢖ ࢒࢔࢕࢖࢔ࢋ࢙࢙ ࢖࢘࢕࢞࢏࢓࢏࢚࢟ 
ࢉ࢘࢏࢓ࢋ 1.111875 
(0.265) 
2.956489 
(0.014)** 
3.207709 
(0.002)** 
ࢇ࢓࢒࢒ 1.055298 
(0.286) 
3.070674 
(0.011)** 
3.219781 
(0.002)** 
࢙࢚࢘ -.0350545 
(0.974) 
2.46731 
(0.049)** 
17.39997 
(0.989) 
ࢉ࢚ࢌ .4332262 
(0.696) 
4.778468 
(0.001)*** 
17.64745 
(0.992) 
NB *, **, *** signifie que le paramètre est significatif à 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
According to this estimation we note: 
*First model (crime as explained variable) 
- The gdp is positive and non-significant which means that there is no 
relationship between the two variables 
- the degree of openness of the economy has a positive and significant effect on 
crime at the level of 5% while the proximity has no significant effect. 
*Second model (anti money law laundering) 
We note that only openness and proximity have positive and significant effects. 
This means that after the adoption of this law the imports and exports increased 
and the terrorism coming from neighbours had been more intense. 
*Third model (suspicious transaction report):  
The adoption of this favour for banks allows them to question the depositor on 
the origin of their money when it exceeds a certain level.  So we note that this 
law had negative effects on gdp meaning that in the past gdp was constructed, 
even partially, by illicit money. So with the adoption of this law the gdp 
decreases and a partial part of illicit money have changed destination.  
*Fourth model (ctf):  
The adoption of the law of criminalizing terrorism financing had no effect on 
growth and proximity (exogenous variable) but had a positive and significant 
effect on degree of trade openness.  
Second version 
In a second version we add a monetary variable (Money and quasi money (M2) 
as% of GDP) as an explanatory variable in the four models to detect their 
effects on money laundering. We obtain the following results in Table (2): 
 
ܿݎ݅݉݁௜௧ = ߚ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߚ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߚ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߚ4݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + ߝ௜௧(5) 
݈݈ܽ݉௜௧ = ߙ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߙ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߙ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߙ4݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + ߝ௜௧(6) 
ݏݐݎ௜௧ = ߛ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߛ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߛ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߛ4݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + ߝ௜௧(7) 
ܿݐ ௜݂௧ = ߜ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ + ߜ2݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߜ3݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߜ4݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + ߝ௜௧ (8) 
Tableau 2: model estimation with lnM2 (logit model) 
 ࢒࢔ࢍࢊ࢖ ࢒࢔࢕࢖࢔ࢋ࢙࢙ ࢖࢘࢕࢞࢏࢓࢏࢚࢟ ࢒࢔ࡹ૛ 
ࢉ࢘࢏࢓ࢋ 1.382713 
(0.178) 
3.069148     
(0.010)** 
3.164545    
(0.002)**   
.4118742    
(0.137) 
ࢇ࢓࢒࢒ 1.369955 
(0.180) 
3.206323  
(0.007)** 
3.170577 
(0.002)** 
.439213    
(0.115) 
࢙࢚࢘ .0182944    
(0.987) 
2.286982     
(0.062)* 
16.65973    
(0.985) 
.2414161    
(0.337) 
ࢉ࢚ࢌ 1.982427    
(0.181) 
5.701063    
(0.000)*** 
16.58791    
(0.990) 
1.66897    
(0.061)* 
 
*, **, *** signifie que le paramètre est significatif à 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
* First model (crime as explained variable) 
We note that only openness and proximity are positive and significant which 
mean that on the moment of criminalizing  laundering the rate of openness of 
gulf economies become more important. This leads us to think that the trade 
(especially the good imports can be a tool of laundering. Also, this law had 
increased the variable proximity which means that there is a migration of money 
laundering to other countries.   
* Second model (amll as explained variable) 
At the moment where the anti-money laundering law has the same sign and 
significance, on the same variables, we can guard the same interpretation above 
mentioned.   
 
* Third model (str) 
We note that the adoption of this law had contributed to the increase of 
openness which means that the trade is one of veiled tools of laundering 
* Fourth model (ctf) 
The effects of openness are always positive and significant. Also, the effect of 
M2 is positive and significant. This signify that the money creation especially 
scriptural money is one of the tools through which pass the money laundering 
Third version 
In the third version we will use the economic growth as the dependent variable 
which be explained by the crime, amll, str, ctf, lnopness, lnM2 and the 
proximity. We have used a GMM estimation of dynamic panel (Arellano-Bond 
(1991)). The used models can be represented as follows: 
݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߚ0 + ߚ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߚ2݈݈ܽ݉௜௧ + ߚ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߚ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ +
ߚ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(9) 
݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ =
ߙ0 + ߙ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߙ2ܿݎ݅݉݁௜௧ + ߙ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߙ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ +
ߙ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(10) 
݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߛ0 + ߛ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߛ2ݏݐݎ௜௧ + ߛ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߛ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ +
ߛ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(11) 
݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߜ0 + ߜ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߜ2ܿݐ ௜݂௧ + ߜ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߜ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ +
ߜ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(12) 
 
With i = 1; 2…6, t = 1980… 2014. The error terms eit = μݐ+ߝ݅ݐ ;μݐ is the specific 
effect for each country, which is assumed to be constant in the time, while ߝ௜௧ is 
assumed to be a random perturbation whose its form is generated by autoregressive 
process of order 1 and ~ iid. The coefficients ߚ݅,ߙ݅, ߛ݅ and ߜ݅ are the parameters to 
estimate. The coefficients associate to the delayed explicative variables ߚ1,ߙ1, ߛ1 
etߜ1mesure the economic convergence of the gulf countries while the coefficients 
ߚ݅,ߙ݅, ߛ݅ etߜ݅(i=2…5) measure the influence of other control  variables. 
Thus, the model we try to estimate is a dynamic model in which one or more delays of 
the dependent variable are included as explanatory variables lagged. Unlike the 
dynamic panel GMM, conventional econometric techniques such as MCO are not able 
to estimate the effectiveness of such a model, due to biased results. 
It is important at this stage of analysis, noted that there are two types of GMM 
estimators: the GMM estimator in difference of (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and the 
GMM estimator in system (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Indeed, the objective of the 
GMM estimator in difference of (Arellano & Bond, 1991) is to eliminate any bias on 
the variables structure. However, (Blundell & Bond, 1998) led to the result that the 
GMM estimator is more efficient than the estimator of GMM in first difference (and 
through the use of Monte Carlo simulations). Therefore, there is a convergence taken 
unanimously by the fact that the first difference GMM produces biased estimators for 
small samples. "Based on the procedure (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and (Blundell & 
Bond 1998), the dynamic model which we will adopt takes the form of models (9) 
(10) (11) (12). 
 
 
Table 3: Results and estimation of model (9): ݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߚ0 + ߚ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ +
ߚ2݈݈ܽ݉௜௧ + ߚ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߚ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߚ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(9) 
 
 Cte ݈݊݃݀݌(−1) ݈݈ܽ݉ ݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ ݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ ݈݊ܯ2 
Panel 1.49742 
(0.000)*** 
.8644357 
(0.000)*** 
-.00238 
(0.724) 
-.0313452 
(0.130) 
.020838 
(0.000)*** 
- 
1.7009 
(0.000)*** 
.850247 
(0.000)*** 
-.001475 
(0.826) 
-.0395231 
(0.055)** 
.0221284 
(0.000)*** 
-.0062678 
(0.220) 
Bahrain 2.897882 
(0.001)*** 
.7943193 
(0.000)*** 
-.0378842 
(0.027)** 
-.1750284 
(0.000)*** 
.0228002 
(0.515) 
- 
2.196081 
(0.083)* 
.8389628 
(0.000)*** 
-.0327181 
(0.090)* 
-.1306507      
(0.083)* 
.0261146 
(0.487) 
.0102508 
(0.426) 
Kuwait 2.213269 
(0.000)*** 
.7925762 
(0.000)*** 
.0150006 
(0.318) 
-.0221931 
(0.735) 
.0212642 
(0.323) 
- 
2.184788 
(0.014)* 
.7874992 
(0.000)*** 
.0299343 
(0.080)* 
-.0255527 
(0.715) 
.019236 
(0.402) 
.0216543 
(0.014)** 
Oman 1.024897 
(0.140) 
.8679491 
(0.000)*** 
-.0213775 
(0.295) 
.0519753 
(0.488) 
-.0034808 
(0.854) 
- 
.8680679 
(0.322) 
.8907942 
(0.000)*** 
-.0220764 
(0.293) 
.0570631 
(0.467) 
-.0003681 
(0.987) 
-.0229964 
(0.760) 
Qatar .6173552 
(0.515) 
.8784244 
(0.000)*** 
.0038297 
(0.893) 
.1595789 
(0.090)* 
.0021009 
(0.920) 
- 
.9040418 
(0.308) 
.8604235 
(0.000)*** 
-.004663 
(0.861) 
.1633948 
(0.060)* 
.0073315 
(0.706) 
-.0270339 
(0.047)** 
Saudi Arabia 1.843065 
(0.000)***
 
.7528827 
(0.000)*** 
.0185952 
(0.542) 
.1091659 
(0.185) 
.0162534 
(0.075)* 
- 
3.163674 
(0.000)*** 
.6857678 
(0.000)*** 
.0393813 
(0.193) 
.0339892 
(0.690) 
.0244867 
(0.009)** 
-.0990463 
(0.039)** 
United Arab 
Emirates 
2.083465 
(0.003)** 
.8518142 
(0.000)*** 
-.0353799 
(0.302) 
-.1113929 
(0.157) 
.0235007 
(0.257) 
- 
2.138071 .848129 -.0329506 -.1103319 .0236567 -.0058833 
(0.004)** (0.000)*** (0.356) (0.172) (0.265) (0.712) 
 
*,**,*** significant at the level of 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
According to table (9) and concerning the whole of our sample we note that the 
delayed variable is positive at the level of 1% which means that these countries will 
diverge in their growth level. All other variables are non-significant.  
The effects of amll are negative and significant in the cases of Bahrain and Kuwait 
meaning that the adoption of this law had decreased the GDP. This means that in the 
past a part of growth is coming from money laundering. The effects of openness are 
negative and significant in the whole of sample and Bahrain and Qatar. This results 
are strange because the economic logic approve the confirm logic. The effects of 
proximity on growth are positive and significant in the cases of According to table (9) 
and concerning the whole of our sample we note that the delayed variable is positive 
at the level of 1% which means that these countries will diverge in their growth level. 
All other variables are non-significant.  
The effects of amll are negative and significant in the cases of Bahrain and Kuwait, 
this means that the adoption of this law had decreased the GDP. The effects of 
openness are negative and significant in Bahrain and Qatar. This results are strange 
because the economic logic is not confirmed this one. Concerning the effects of 
proximity on growth, we note that are positive and significant on the cases of the 
whole of countries (panel) the Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. A priori the proximity of 
these countries to risk countries, allows them to produce more follows the increase of 
the whole demand. 
 
 
 
Tableau 4: estimation of model (10)  ݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߙ0 + ߙ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ +
ߙ2ܿݎ݅݉݁௜௧ + ߙ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߙ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߙ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(10) 
 Cte ݈݊݃݀݌(−1) ܿݎ݅݉݁ ݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ ݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ ݈݊ܯ2 
Panel 1.493517 
(0.000)*** 
.8646892 
(0.000)*** 
-.0030529 
(0.654) 
-.0310193 
(0.133) 
.0210372 
(0.000)*** 
- 
1.696591 
(0.000)*** 
.8505178 
(0.000)*** 
-.0021584 
(0.750) 
-.0391623 
(0.056)* 
.0223259 
(0.000)*** 
-.0062455 
(0.222) 
Bahrain 2.897882 
 (0.001)*** 
.7943193 
(0.000)*** 
-.0378842 
(0.027)** 
-.1750284 
(0.000)*** 
.0228002 
(0.515) 
- 
2.196081 
(0.083)* 
.8389628 
(0.000)*** 
-.0327181 
(0.090)* 
-.1306507 
(0.083)* 
.0261146 
(0.487) 
.0102508 
(0.426) 
Kuwait 2.213269 
(0.019)* 
.7925762 
(0.000)*** 
.0150006 
(0.318) 
-.0221931 
(0.735) 
.0212642 
(0.323) 
- 
2.184788 
(0.029)** 
.7874992 
(0.000)*** 
.0299343 
(0.080)* 
-.0255527 
(0.715) 
.019236 
(0.402) 
.0216543 
(0.014)** 
Oman 1.024897 
(0.140) 
.8679491 
(0.000)*** 
-.0213775 
(0.295) 
.0519753 
(0.488) 
-.0034808 
(0.854) 
- 
.8680679 
(0.322) 
.8907942 
(0.000)*** 
-.0220764 
(0.293) 
.0570631 
(0.467) 
-.0003681 
(0.987) 
-.0229964 
(0.760) 
Qatar .66995 
(0.482) 
.8758665 
(0.000) 
.0072213 
(0.801) 
.1537985 
(0.087) 
.0017837 
(0.932) 
- 
.9113597 
(0.305) 
.8606228 
(0.000)*** 
-.0040974 
(0.879) 
.1611872 
(0.053)** 
.0074629 
(0.701) 
-.02709 
(0.048)** 
Saudi Arabia 1.843065 
(0.000)*** 
.7528827 
(0.000)*** 
.0185952 
(0.542) 
.1091659 
(0.185) 
.0162534 
(0.075)* 
- 
3.163674 
(0.000)*** 
.6857678 
(0.000)*** 
.0393813 
(0.193) 
.0339892 
(0.690) 
.0244867 
(0.009)** 
-.0990463 
(0.039)** 
United Arab 2.083465 .8518142 -.0353799 -.1113929 .0235007 - 
Emirates (0.003)** (0.000)*** (0.302) (0.157) (0.257) 
2.138071 
(0.004)** 
.848129 
(0.000)*** 
-.0329506 
(0.356) 
-.1103319 
(0.172) 
.0236567 
(0.265) 
-.0058833 
(0.712) 
*, **, *** signifie que le paramètre est significatif à 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
In this model version we note the divergence phenomena. The variable crime had 
negative and significant effects on Bahrain and Kuwait which means that when these 
countries have criminalized money laundering their growth had decreases. The money 
had a positive effect on growth in Oman and negative and significant effects on Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia. The variable openness continues to be negative and significant on 
the whole sample, Bahrain and positive and significant on Qatar. 
Tableau 5 : estimation result of equation (11) 
݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߛ0 + ߛ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߛ2ݏݐݎ௜௧ + ߛ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߛ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ +
ߛ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cte ݈݊݃݀݌(−1) ݏݐݎ ݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ ݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ ݈݊ܯ2 
Panel 1.475343 
(0.000)*** 
.8654845 
(0.000)*** 
-.0077272 
(0.292) 
-.0286428 
(0.167) 
.0224721 
(0.000)*** 
- 
1.67703 
(0.000)*** 
.8514173 
(0.000)*** 
-.0069474 
(0.340) 
-.0367245 
(0.074)* 
.0237844 
(0.000)*** 
-.006211 
(0.225) 
Bahrain 2.897882 
(0.001)*** 
.7943193 
(0.000)*** 
-.0378842 
(0.027)** 
-.1750284 
(0.000)*** 
.0228002 
(0.515) 
- 
2.196081 
(0.083)* 
.8389628 
(0.000)*** 
-.0327181 
(0.090)* 
-.1306507 
(0.083)* 
.0261146 
(0.487) 
.0102508 
(0.426) 
Kuwait 2.514535 
(0.009)** 
.7687603 
(0.000)*** 
.0204385 
(0.179) 
-.0355725 
(0.577) 
.0243424 
(0.243) 
- 
2.712711 
(0.008)** 
.7461192 
(0.000)*** 
.0394407 
(0.023)** 
-.0517444 
(0.442) 
.0250072 
(0.253) 
.023718 
(0.005)** 
Oman .6068614 
(0.274) 
.8788973 
(0.000)*** 
-.0731039 
(0.003)** 
.1231056 
(0.091)* 
.0155313 
(0.446) 
- 
.8403944 
(0.219) 
.8367887 
(0.000)*** 
-.0771723 
(0.003)** 
.1221988 
(0.101) 
.0104071 
(0.643) 
.0478537 
(0.544) 
Qatar .66995 
(0.482) 
.8758665 
(0.000)*** 
.0072213 
(0.801) 
.1537985 
(0.087)** 
.0017837 
(0.932) 
- 
.9113597 
(0.305) 
.8606228 
(0.000)*** 
-.0040974 
(0.879) 
.1611872 
(0.053)* 
.0074629 
(0.701) 
-.02709 
(0.048)** 
Saudi Arabia 1.717038 
(0.000)*** 
.7418009 
(0.000)*** 
-.0247405 
(0.551) 
.1623276 
(0.049)** 
.0268674 
(0.022)** 
- 
2.971214 
(0.001)*** 
.6755866 
(0.000)*** 
.0095329 
(0.836) 
.0882599 
(0.347) 
.0294692 
(0.011)** 
-.0835939 
(0.125) 
United Arab 
Emirates 
2.083465 
(0.003)** 
.8518142 
(0.000)*** 
-.0353799 
(0.302) 
-.1113929 
(0.157) 
.0235007 
(0.257) 
- 
2.138071 
(0.004)** 
.848129 
(0.000)*** 
-.0329506 
(0.356) 
-.1103319 
(0.172) 
.0236567 
(0.265) 
-.0058833 
(0.712) 
*, **, *** signifie que le paramètre est significatif à 10%, 5%, 1% 
 
Relatively to other models we note that (str) had a negative effects on growth in 
Bahrain and Oman and positive and significant effect on Kuwait.  
 
 
Table 6 : estimation results ݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ = ߜ0 + ߜ1݈݊݃݀݌௜௧ିଵ + ߜ2ܿݐ ௜݂௧ +
ߜ3݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ௜௧ + ߜ4݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ௜௧ + ߜ5݈݊ܯ2௜௧ + μݐ + ߝ௜௧(12) 
 
 cte ݈݊݃݀݌(−1) ܿݐ݂ ݈݊݋݌݊݁ݏݏ ݌ݎ݋ݔ݅݉݅ݐݕ ݈݊ܯ2 
Panel 1.475964 
(0.000)*** 
.8642183 
(0.000)*** 
-.0083803 
(0.315) 
-.0260659 
(0.223) 
.0219805 
(0.000)*** 
- 
1.672868 
(0.000)*** 
.8508206 
(0.000)*** 
-.0065902 
(0.431) 
-.0349524 
(0.101) 
.023061 
(0.000)*** 
-.0057779 
(0.263) 
Bahrain 3.368812 
(0.000)*** 
.7434958 
(0.000)*** 
-.0398252 
(0.015)** 
-.1715288 
(0.000)*** 
.032888 
(0.352) 
- 
2.712982 
(0.043)** 
.7876649 
(0.000)*** 
-.0352308 
(0.058)* 
-.1339779 
(0.066)* 
.034577 
(0.357) 
.0087896 
(0.494) 
Kuwait 1.897596 
(0.032)** 
.8240782 
(0.000)*** 
- -.0225232 
(0.731) 
.0214159 
(0.319) 
- 
1.640848 
(0.077)* 
.8437678 
(0.000)*** 
- -.0252859 
(0.710) 
.0200098 
(0.371) 
.0162211 
(0.042)** 
Oman 1.365833 
(0.033)** 
.8415553 
(0.000)*** 
-.0105562 
(0.635) 
.0295306 
(0.706) 
-.0039074 
(0.838) 
- 
1.355106 
(0.059)* 
.8438398 
(0.000)*** 
-.0102608 
(0.670) 
.0293012 
(0.715) 
-.0035913 
(0.867) 
-.0028108 
(0.972) 
Qatar .66995 .8758665 .0072213 .1537985 .0017837 - 
(0.482) (0.000)*** (0.801) (0.087)* (0.932) 
.9113597 
(0.305) 
.8606228 
(0.000)*** 
-.0040974 
(0.879) 
.1611872 
(0.053)* 
.0074629 
(0.701) 
-.02709 
(0.048)** 
Saudi Arabia 1.90781 
(0.000)*** 
.7354722 
(0.000)*** 
.0116422 
(0.694) 
.1328413 
(0.059)* 
.0180449 
(0.039)** 
- 
4.500745 
(0.000)*** 
.5676683 
(0.000)*** 
.0772427 
(0.032)** 
.0398906 
(0.581) 
.0247881 
(0.003)** 
-.1628311 
(0.006)** 
United Arab 
Emirates 
1.722966 
(0.022)** 
.8438248 
(0.000)*** 
-.0874638 
(0.072)* 
-.0132717 
(0.898) 
.0172525 
(0.415) 
- 
1.775458 
(0.024)** 
.84042 
(0.000)*** 
-.0853484 
(0.089)* 
-.0130376 
(0.902) 
.0173996 
(0.422) 
-.0049812 
(0.753) 
 
The variable ctf  had a positive and significant effects on Saudi Arabia and UAE 
and negative and significant effects on growth 
5. Conclusion  
As a conclusion we can say that the results are consistent. First we have showed 
that when the crime is the explained variable we note that only the variables 
openness and proximity are positive and significant. This means that on the 
moment of criminalizing laundering the rate of openness of gulf economies 
become more important. This leads us to think that the trade (especially the 
good imports can be a tool of laundering. Also, this law had increased the 
variable proximity which means that there is a migration of money laundering 
to other countries.  We note that only openness and proximity have positive and 
significant effects. This means that after the adoption of this law the imports and 
exports increased and the terrorism coming from neighbours had been more 
intense. The same effects are unregistered when amll is the explained variable. 
In the third case when the explained variable is suspicious transaction report we 
notice that this law had negative effects on gdp meaning that in the past, gdp 
was, in part, constructed, even partially, by illicit money. So with the adoption 
of this law the gdp decreases and a partial part of illicit money have changed 
destination. In the fourth case we note that when ctf is considered as explained 
variable the adoption of the law of criminalizing terrorism financing had no 
effect on growth and proximity (exogenous variable) but had a positive and 
significant effect on degree of trade openness.  
 
 
* Third model (str) 
We note that the adoption of this law had contributed to the increase of 
openness which means that the trade is one of veiled tools of laundering 
* Fourth model (ctf) 
The effects of openness are always positive and significant. Also, the effect of 
M2 is positive and significant. This signify that the money creation especially 
scriptural money is one of the tools through which pass the money laundering 
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